[Nfd-dev] [Ndn-app] NDN-RTC poke Data to CS

[Dave Oran (oran)]

OK, thanks for the clarification. Test question: how long do you think it will be before somebody jiggers the TCP connection to home on a remote box :-)

Among the implementation options you list below, it seems a fast Repo would be the best way forward, given that the lack of a fast repo would like cause more hacks to migrate either up to the application or down to the forwarder.

One thing you said below did confuse me: "you don't know how long the frames will really stay in the content store.” Don’t all data objects have a timeout? Why would you not set the timeout to the playout deadline established by the application? Or are you concerned about eviction too soon as opposed to them hanging around too long? 

On Mar 19, 2014, at 10:42 AM, Burke, Jeff <jburke at remap.ucla.edu> wrote:

> 
> Dave,
> 
> Sorry, this is a specific case that indeed requires some backstory:
> 
> - We are only talking about local content injection – i.e., from app to its local daemon.
> 
> - This is a "feature" of NDNx/CCNx used in applications like our rtc implementation to provide a local buffer for publishing.  Frames get pushed out as soon as they are captured, and the app itself doesn't have to worry about buffering them.  The main downside is actually that you don't know how long the frames will really stay in the content store.
> 
> - We do something similar (dumping frames as captured) in video playout with a repository. 
> 
> - I'm only concerned with preserving support for this in the initial NFD release so we can quickly test the application as is. There are three other solutions that seem better:  1) implement an application-side buffer in the library; we will do this soon;  2) provide an authenticated mechanism to control how the local daemon handles such pushed data; 3) have a fast local repo implementation that can be used for the same purpose.
> 
> But there's no unsolicited content injection into the network.
> 
> Jeff
> 
> From: "Dave Oran (oran)" <oran at cisco.com>
> Date: Wed, 19 Mar 2014 11:06:31 +0000
> To: Alex Afanasyev <alexander.afanasyev at ucla.edu>
> Cc: Jeff Burke <jburke at remap.ucla.edu>, "ndn-app at lists.cs.ucla.edu" <ndn-app at lists.cs.ucla.edu>, "Gusev, Peter" <peter at remap.ucla.edu>, "bzhang at cs.arizona.edu" <bzhang at cs.arizona.edu>, "nfd-dev at lists.cs.ucla.edu" <nfd-dev at lists.cs.ucla.edu>
> Subject: Re: [Ndn-app] [Nfd-dev] NDN-RTC poke Data to CS
> 
> Abject confusion.
> 
> I thought one of the deep tenets of NDN was that it would be infeasible to inject unsolicited data into the network, thus eliminating all forms of flooding attacks other than of Interest messages.
> 
> Snooping a broadcast wire is a special case where the data was in fact solicited (and the interest could have been snooped too).
> 
> Sorry, but I clearly have not been privy to any of the backstory here, so it kind of hit me out of the blue.
> 
> DaveO.
> 
> On Mar 19, 2014, at 2:39 AM, "Alex Afanasyev" <alexander.afanasyev at ucla.edu> wrote:
> 
>> Hi Jeff,
>> 
>> Even in the first release, there is no problem with unsolicited data caching for **local** faces (unix socket and tcp connection to localhost address), which should be sufficient for any stand-alone application, including ndnrtc.
>> 
>> I'm kind of blanking right now on how ndnrtc relates to browser (is it inside browser and can do local connection or javascript will to websockets for that).  If it is websocket, then the websocket "proxy" (and/or special face inside NFD---just in case, this will not be in the first release) can be made "local", so unsolicited caching can be enabled.
>> 
>> In any case, as Beichuan pointed out, Junxiao described the behavior that will be in the first release, which will have exactly one hard-coded caching policy for the content stored.  Next releases would have policies that can be adjusted per node.
>> 
>> ---
>> Alex
>> 
>> On Mar 18, 2014, at 10:44 PM, Burke, Jeff <jburke at remap.ucla.edu> wrote:
>> 
>>> Hi Beichuan,
>>> 
>>> Thanks for the further explanation.
>>> 
>>> We would like to run the ndnrtc on NFD as an initial test – should we look for this functionality in the repo or try to provide it in the library?  (or both?)
>>> 
>>> thanks,
>>> Jeff
>>> 
>>> 
>>> From: "bzhang at cs.arizona.edu" <bzhang at cs.arizona.edu>
>>> Date: Tue, 18 Mar 2014 22:38:31 -0700
>>> To: Junxiao Shi <shijunxiao at email.arizona.edu>
>>> Cc: "ndn-app at lists.cs.ucla.edu" <ndn-app at lists.cs.ucla.edu>, Peter Gusev <peter at remap.ucla.edu>, <nfd-dev at lists.cs.ucla.edu>
>>> Subject: Re: [Nfd-dev] NDN-RTC poke Data to CS
>>> 
>>> In my opinion, caching unsolicited data or not should be the choice of each individual node; nothing in the architecture or protocol prevents that.
>>> 
>>> What Junxiao said is probably what the first release of NFD will have. 
>>> 
>>> Beichuan
>>> 
>>> On Mar 18, 2014, at 7:57 PM, Junxiao Shi <shijunxiao at email.arizona.edu> wrote:
>>> 
>>>> Hi Peter
>>>> In seminar slides you mention that the RTC application in browser may poke Data to a remote forwarder.
>>>> I want to inform you that NFD will not admit any unsolicited Data from non-local face. NFD will admit unsolicited Data from local face, but they will be the first to get evicted when CS is full.
>>>> You should insert Data into a  repository instead.
>>>> Yours, Junxiao
>>>> _______________________________________________
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>>>> Nfd-dev at lists.cs.ucla.edu
>>>> http://www.lists.cs.ucla.edu/mailman/listinfo/nfd-dev
>>> 
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>> 
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