[Ndn-interest] Largest DDoS attack ever delivered by botnet of hijacked IoT devices

GTS gts at ics.uci.edu
Mon Sep 26 13:34:14 PDT 2016

I generally agree with Cedric. In CCN (i.e., NDN & CCNx), the so-called 
"attack surface"
will change shape but it's area will remain almost the same. In 
particular, attacks
such as the one Christos mentions, where IoT devices act as mini-zombies 
(DoS attack sources),
are unfortunately still possible. Just not in the same way...

One notable item in the shifting attack surface is this: in CCN, an 
end-entity (e.g., an IoT
device) that only acts as a consumer (never produces anything), can not 
be DoS-attacked
in the usual manner, since the only way it can be "reached" is by 
content that *it*
has actually requested. In IP, that's certainly not the case.

But, if an end-entity can request content, it can in principle be 
infected by malware.^$
Thus, it can still be turned into a mini-zombie. :-)


$ Or, it can be infected prior to being put in service.

Gene Tsudik
Chancellor's Professor of Computer Science
University of California, Irvine

On 9/26/16 11:43 AM, Cedric Westphal wrote:
> That's very interesting. But since it's sent on this mailing list: would NDN be an answer to this? If the millions of IoT devices involved in the attack request a distinct object under the attacked page's prefix, it would happen exactly the same way, wouldn't it? And if all requests are for the same name, then it's the caching infrastructure of the high degree nodes that becomes attacked and shifting the attack target from akamai to a highly connected router is not a good trade-off.
> C.
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Ndn-interest [mailto:ndn-interest-bounces at lists.cs.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Christos Papadopoulos
> Sent: Sunday, September 25, 2016 6:04 PM
> To: ndn-interest at lists.cs.ucla.edu
> Subject: [Ndn-interest] Largest DDoS attack ever delivered by botnet of hijacked IoT devices
> http://www.networkworld.com/article/3123672/security/largest-ddos-attack-ever-delivered-by-botnet-of-hijacked-iot-devices.html
> Apologies if you have seen this already, but 600+Gbps DDoS attack from
> IoT devices is truly remarkable. Moreover, it was *not* and reflection
> attack! The target was protected by Akamai, who had to drop them (it was
> hosted pro-bono) after a few days of sustained attack because it was
> costing too much.
> There are a few elements that might make this event a game changer. (a)
> from now on, people may want to always talk about security in IoT, (b)
> it raises questions about protecting the little guy from DDoS, the
> customer here found a home at Google's Project Shield, but obviously
> this is not scalable, and (c) cloud protection from DDoS is not a
> general solution despite what cloud providers will have you believe.
> To me such events bring to focus the weaknesses and fragility of the IP
> architecture. With billions of IoT devices projected in the future, even
> one packet/second (or even per minute) from a fraction of these devices
> would be enough to cause real damage. We all know about the code quality
> and ease of patching of IoT devices, this will not change.
> Maybe Bruce Schneier 's near-apocalyptic thoughts are not too far off.
> https://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram/archives/2016/0915.html#2
> Christos.
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