[Ndn-interest] NDN protocol principles: no privacy?
Tai-Lin Chu
tailinchu at gmail.com
Mon Mar 14 20:44:08 PDT 2016
> sure - I don't want to expose names that identify me, or expose my communication activities. given that, the "network" doesn't have the job of finding things for me by partial names - I only want to expose the details of my communication to a service that I have authenticated, and only when those details are encrypted. the "names" visible to the network in that sort of world just get the packets moving - and the only LPM needed is LPM in the FIB to get me to one or more instances of a service.
Immutability is related to in-network discovery with LPM. If all packets are immutable, and there is no in-network discovery, ndn must rely on some other protocol that cannot not build on top of ndn for discovery (we should all agree that randomly guessing a version number or a certain name is not going to work well as “discovery”). This devalues ndn as an “universal" protocol.
> On Mar 14, 2016, at 12:10 PM, Mark Stapp <mjs at cisco.com> wrote:
>
> interesting -
>
> On 3/14/16 11:27 AM, Burke, Jeff wrote:
>>
> [...]
> RFC 6973 takes a nice approach, for example, by offering
>>> definitions of some technical properties and mechanisms, but not trying
>>> to formulate an overall definition of "privacy".
>>
>> So I can try to understand your point here - do you agree with the
> authors that the primary privacy concerns are those of individuals? (Or,
> more generally, are corporations people here for this discussion - a
> more generic "data owner"?)
>>
>
> hmm - well, I don't think corporations are people, in the citizens united sense, but I think there's lots of commercial communication that needs to have the best possible protection, whether it's B2C or B2B?
>
>>> The editors there say
>>> that the body of the document, the discussion of the tradeoffs and
>>> alternatives, is the best way they could come up with to approach that
>>> abstraction. in practical terms, as you know well I think there's been
>>> an over-reliance on opportunistic caching in ICN generally, and as a
>>> result observability and correlation are defined to be positive
>>> properties of ICN communication rather than harmful ones.
>>
>>
>> Would I be correct to parse your concerns into two pieces that may
> have different implications:
>>
>> - Confidentiality of request (e.g., the consumer side)
>> - Confidentiality of publication (e.g., the publisher side)
>>
>
> I think I have a mental image of "confidential request" - where an observer cannot see much beyond the routeable prefix needed to reach an instance of the service I want to communicate with. I'm not sure what "confidential publication" means, though? I think I want the replies to my requests to be encrypted with ephemeral, forward-secure key material, I don't want the names in the replies to expose any more than the names in the requests, and I want to be able to authenticate the service before I expose anything about my own identity or intentions. is that what you meant by "the publisher side"?
>
> [...]
>
>>>
>>> most of these six "principles" sounded like "mechanisms" to me - the
>>> list felt like the end of a discussion about alternatives and the best
>>> ways to implement an architecture, rather than the start of one. it
>>> sounded like "we're tired of questions about LPM in the PIT, so we're
>>> going to stop calling that a possible mechanism and start calling it an
>>> inevitable, immutable, unquestionable 'principle'".
>>
>> Well, to take LPM for an example - it's actually not mentioned in
>> the
> principle doc that Alex sent. The principle I suspect that you are
> referring to is:
>>
>> [5] In-Network Name Discovery: Interests should be able use
>> incomplete
> names to retrieve data packets.
>> A consumer may not know the complete network-level name for data, as
> some parts of the name cannot be guessed, computed, or inferred
> beforehand. Once initial data is received, naming conventions can help
> determine complete names of other related data:
>>
>>
>> * majority of interests will carry complete names
>>
>> * in-network name discovery expected to be used to bootstrap
> communication)
>>
>>
>>
>> Can you explain your objection in these terms?
>>
>
> sure - I don't want to expose names that identify me, or expose my communication activities. given that, the "network" doesn't have the job of finding things for me by partial names - I only want to expose the details of my communication to a service that I have authenticated, and only when those details are encrypted. the "names" visible to the network in that sort of world just get the packets moving - and the only LPM needed is LPM in the FIB to get me to one or more instances of a service.
>
> Thanks,
> Mark
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