[Ndn-interest] Adding HMAC to available NDN signature types
gts at ics.uci.EDU
Tue Sep 23 09:04:33 PDT 2014
>>> The mechanism for key management should be designed, in order for HMAC
signing to be useful.
Just as a word of caution,
I hope that, instead of designing a homegrown (and quite possibly insecure)
NDN- or CCNx-specific
key management approach, people consult ample prior work that contains many
i.e.., using public key-based authenticated key exchange/agreement to yield
a symmetric key.
(By "prior work" I don't just mean papers but also real deployed protocols.)
On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 8:47 AM, Junxiao Shi <shijunxiao at email.arizona.edu>
> Dear folks
> It appears to me that HMAC, as a signing algorithm that requires a
> symmetric key, is suitable only for realtime applications with a small
> number of mutually trusted participants.
> The reasons are:
> - Participants must be mutually trusted, because any participant who
> wants to verify Data must know the symmetric key, and knowing the symmetric
> key allows a participant to sign Data as well.
> - Verifying old Data requires knowing the symmetric key. However, it's
> impossible to establish mutual trust when the participant who generated the
> Data is gone. Thus HMAC is suitable for realtime applications only, where
> all participants are still alive.
> To use HMAC signing, we must first use existing pubkey signing methods to
> establish mutual trust between participants, and negotiate a symmetric key.
> This key should also be rotated periodically.
> The mechanism for key management should be designed, in order for HMAC
> signing to be useful.
> Yours, Junxiao
> Ndn-interest mailing list
> Ndn-interest at lists.cs.ucla.edu
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