[Ndn-interest] NACKs in ICN

[Mark Stapp]

Thanks for sending this around, Cesar. It's certainly good to see some 
details confirming the intuition that it would be costly for producers 
to try to use public-key operations on adversary-selected inputs as a 
means of denial-of-existence. but ... the paper doesn't explore many 
alternative schemes - we presented five, I think, at the last icnrg 
meeting. the conclusion of the paper - that NACKs have security problems 
- seems a little strong, based on the small number of approaches 
considered.

It would be very interesting to see whether your analytical tools might 
be able to be applied to some of the other approaches.

Thanks,
Mark

On 3/9/15 9:14 PM, Cesar Ghali wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> Some of you might be interested in the following report:
>
> A. Compagno, M. Conti, C. Ghali, G. Tsudik,
> To NACK or not to NACK? Negative Acknowledgments in Information-Centric
> Networking,
> arXiv: 1503.02123, March 7, 2015.
> URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/1503.02123v1.pdf
>
> Of course, comments are appreciated.
>
> Thanks,
> Cesar
>
> --
> PGP Key: http://www.cesarghali.info/contact.html
> PGP Key ID: 0x455D8052
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Ndn-interest mailing list
> Ndn-interest at lists.cs.ucla.edu
> http://www.lists.cs.ucla.edu/mailman/listinfo/ndn-interest
>